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I. INTRODUCTION
The ability to ascertain what law will govern a commercial trans-
action is necessary when parties engage in international business trans-
actions and contracts. The ability to ascertain the law governing a par-
ticular contract benefits the parties in two ways. First, certainty allows
the parties to better plan their performance under the contract. Second,
certainty permits better contract drafting and contingency planning by
the parties.'
The multinational market of Europe recognized this need for a
uniform conflict of law rule for the law of contracts.' Prior to 1980,
each country of Europe followed its own law when dealing with con-
flicts of law that occurred in contract cases.3 Most European countries
permitted the contracting parties to choose the law that governed the
contract.
* B.A., University of Arizona; J.D., University of Minnesota School Of Law; As-
sociate Attorney, William B. Revis, Ltd., Phoenix, Arizona. The author would like to
express his gratitude to Professor P.B. Carter, Wadham College, Oxford, for his inspi-
ration and assistance in the writing of this article.
1. See, E. SCOLES AND P. HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 18.13 at 652 (1982) ("The
protection of party expectations in contract requires a high degree of predictability as
to the applicable law").
2. See infra notes 5-9 and accompanying text.
3. See infra note 4.
4. See GUILIANO AND LAGARDE, infra note 6 at 29-37 (Survey of French, Ger-
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On June 19, 1980, the parties' freedom to choose the law that gov-
erns their contract was codified in the EEC Convention on the Law
Applicable to Contractual Obligations.' The EEC Convention was orig-
inally conceived in the Brussels Working Group of February 26-28,
1969.6 At present, the treaty has been ratified by nine EEC member
countries.7 Even after being in existence for almost seven years, how-
ever, the EEC Convention is not presently being employed anywhere in
the Common Market. The countries farthest along towards enacting
the EEC Convention are France and Germany.'
The United States has also adopted a rule that allows contracting
parties to choose the law governing their contract.' The prior approach
to conflicts of law for contracts was to apply the law of the place of the
last act necessary to make the contract legally effective.1" The place-of-
making rule for contracts, however, has been criticized as overly am-
biguous.11 Deciding when the last act by the parties necessary to make
the contract legally effective has occurred is both conceptually difficult
and subject to manipulation by the parties and the courts.12 The uncer-
tainty of the place-of-making rule, therefore, hurts business planning
and contract formation.
Conflicts law in the area of contracts, in light of the difficulties
with the place-of-making rule, was reformulated in the Restatement
(Second) of Conflicts of Law. 3 The Restatement Second was adopted
and promulgated by the American Law Institute on May 23, 1969 and
man, Belgium and English law along with arbitration decisions and international
treaties).
5. Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, 1980 [hereinaf-
ter the "EEC Convention"].
6. M. GIULIANO AND P. LAGARDE, Report on the Law Applicable to Contractual
Obligations, 1 (1980) [hereinafter the "Convention Report"].
7. Conversation with Professor P.B. Carter, Professor of Law, Wadham College,
Oxford University (April 12, 1987).
8. See supra notes 3-4 and 7 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
10. SCOLES AND HAY, supra note 1, § 18.14, 653-55; R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CON-
FLICTS LAW § 145, 297-99 (3d ed. 1977).
11. See, LEFLAR, supra note 6 § 144.
12. id.
13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1971) [hereinafter the "RE-
STATEMENT SECOND"]. Portions of the RESTATEMENT SECOND, specifically section 187,
have been "invoked as authoritative in one or another respect by a substantial number
of courts." G. SIMPSON, ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES IN CONFLICT OF LAWS 222 (1985);
see also 36 AM. J. COMP. LAW, 547, 552 (1988) (In 1987 "[tlhe RESTATEMENT SEC-
OND OF CONFLICTS is cited approvingly with increasing frequency but language reflect-
ing some version of interest analysis is also often used").
THE EEC CONVENTION
published in 1971.14 To replace the place-of-making rule, the Restate-
ment Second, as in the EEC Convention, gives the parties greater free-
dom to choose the law that governs their contract, subject to certain
qualifications.16
This article compares the operation of the EEC Convention and
the Restatement Second. First, the scope of each is compared. Second,
the rules governing the circumstances in which the parties have made a
choice of law is examined. Third, the rules governing the circumstances
in which the parties have not made a choice of law is examined. Fi-
nally, this article analyzes the doctrine of renvoi under the EEC Con-
vention and the Restatement Second.
II. THE SCOPE OF THE EEC CONVENTION AND THE RESTATEMENT
SECOND
The scope of the EEC Convention is defined in Article 1, which
provides that "the rules of this Convention shall apply to contractual
obligations in any situation involving a choice of law between the laws
of different countries." 16 Article One, however, fails to define the scope
of what is a "contractual obligation. ' 17 The threshold question of what
is a contractual obligation is left for characterization by the parties
with the ultimate determination left up to the courts. Thus, self inter-
ested parties and potentially result-oriented courts can completely avoid
the effects of the EEC Convention by recasting transactions as being
noncontractual.
The Restatement Second suffers from the same threshold defini-
tion problems as the EEC Convention. In the introductory note of the
Restatement Second the term "contract" is used to refer both to en-
forceable promises and to other agreements or promises which are
claimed to be legally enforceable but are not so." Thus, while the Re-
statement Second may cover both effective and ineffective contracts,
the problem of deciding whether a transaction is contractual, however,
14. Id.
15. See infra notes 26-28 & 31 and accompanying text.
16. EEC Convention, supra note 2, at Article 1 at 3.
17. Compare EEC Convention, supra note 2, at Article 1 at 3 with RESTATEMENT
SECOND supra note 13, Chapter 8 introductory note.
18. RESTATEMENT SECOND supra note 13, Chapter 8 (introductory note). The
note provides as follows:
INTRODUCTORY NOTE: In the Restatement of this Subject, the term "contract" is used
to refer both to legally enforceable promises and to other agreements or promises which
are claimed to be enforceable but are not legally so.
19891
226 MD. JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & TRADE [Vol. 13
remains.
With regard to the EEC Convention, this broad scope is limited by
Section Two of Article 1. Section Two provides that the EEC Conven-
tion shall not apply to questions of status or legal capacity.19 In addi-
tion, some of the other important areas not covered by the EEC Con-
vention are contractual obligations relating to wills and succession,
matrimonial property, family matters, negotiable instruments, arbitra-
tion agreements, company law, agency, evidence and procedure.20
The Restatement Second lacks a provision that is similar to the
EEC Convention Article 1(2). In some areas excluded by the EEC
Convention, such as wills, matrimonial property, family matters, the
law of companies, agency, evidence and procedure, the Restatement
Second is silent as to scope. The exclusion of these areas by omission in
the Restatement Second, and their specific exclusion by EEC Conven-
tion Article 1(2), allow further opportunities to avoid both systems of
choice of law rules for contracts by characterizing potential agreements
19. EEC Convention, supra note 5, at Article I(2)(a) at 3. The EEC Convention
provides as follows:
(2) They [the rules of the EEC Convention] shall not apply to: (a) questions involving
the status or legal capacity of natural persons, without prejudice to Article 11.
id.
20. EEC Convention, supra note 5, at Article I(2)(b)-(h) at 3-4. The EEC Con-
vention provides as follows:
(2) They [the rules of the EEC Convention] shall not apply to: . . . (b) contractual
obligations relating to:
- wills and succession;
- Rights in property arising out of a matrimonial relationship;
- rights and duties arising out of a matrimonial relationship, parentage, marriage or
affinity, including maintenance obligations in respect of children who are not
legitimate;
(c) obligations arising under bills of exchange, cheques and promissory notes and other
negotiable instruments to the extent that the obligations under such other negotiable
instruments arise out of their negotiable character;
(d) arbitration agreements and agreements on the choice of court;
(e) questions governed by the law of companies and other bodies corporate and unin-
corporated such as the creation, by registration or otherwise, legal capacity, internal
organization or winding up of companies and other bodies corporate or unincorporated
and the personal liability of officers and members as such for the obligations of the
company or body;
(f) the question of whether and agent is liable to bind a principal, or an organ to bind a
company or body a company or body corporate or incorporate, to a third party;
(g) the constitution of trusts and the relationship between settlors, trustees and
beneficiaries;
(h) evidence and procedure, without prejudice to Article 14.
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as excluded transactions.
The Restatement Second does, however, cover four areas which
are not covered by the EEC Convention: status and capacity, negotia-
ble instruments, certain insurance contracts, and arbitration. First, re-
garding questions of capacity, Section 198 governs by reference to the
local law chosen by the parties, subject to the qualifications in section
187; or by the local law of the state with the most significant relation-
ship to the transaction and the parties in cases where no law was cho-
sen by the parties.21
The EEC Convention would leave the choice of law for questions
of status or legal capacity to the choice of law rules followed by the
forum court. 2 The only exception is provided in Article 11., which pre-
vents a party from invoking the contractual defense of incapacity when
the contract was concluded between persons who are in the same coun-
try and when as a result of his own negligence the other party to the
contract was not aware of this incapacity at the conclusion of the
contract.2
The Restatement Second protects a party from unfair surprise at
the contractual incapacity of her contract partner, when the parties do
not make a choice of law, by governing the contract by the law chosen
by the partners, or by the law of the forum with the most significant
contacts.2 4 Both parties are assumed to know the capacity rules of the
21. RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 13, § 198. The section provides as follows:
(1)The capacity of the parties to contract is determined by the law selected by applica-
tions of the rules of Sections 187-188.
(2)The capacity of a party to contract will usually be upheld if he has such capacity
under the local law of the state of his domicile.
Id.
22. EEC Convention, supra note 5, at Article I(2)(a).
23. EEC Convention, supra note 5, at Article 11
("Incapacity"). The EEC Convention provides as follows:
In a contract concluded between persons who are in the same country, a natural
person who would have capacity under the law of that country may invoke his
incapacity resulting from another law only if the other party to the contract was
aware of this incapacity at the time of the conclusion of the contract or was not
aware thereof as a result of negligence.
Id.
24. RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 13, § 198 comment b. The comment pro-
vides as follows:
If the state of a person's domicile has chosen to give him capacity to contract, or
in other words has determined that he is not in need of the protection which a rule
of incapacity would bring, there can usually be little reason why the local law of
some other state should be applied to give him this protection and to declare the
contract invalid to the disappointment of the parties' expectations. This should
19891
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law that they chose to govern the contract or of the location whose
contacts are the most significant to the contract.25
In questions of capacity, however, the protection of the Restate-
ment Second may be inadequate. The state whose law is chosen to gov-
ern the contract, while having the most significant contacts to the con-
tract, may not be the residence of both contracting parties. The
contracting party who resides in the state with the most significant con-
tacts to the contract may lack the information necessary to ascertain
the true capacity of foreign parties to the contract.
Article 11. of the EEC Convention directly confronts the problem
of surprise involved in the contractual defense of incapacity. Assertion
of the defense of incapacity is limited to instances where the con-
tracting party knew of the other's incapacity prior to contract forma-
tion or at the time of the conclusion of the contract. "6 While the EEC
Convention lacks a completely certain choice of law rule for choosing
the law of capacity, Article Eleven minimizes much of the potential of
unfair surprise by limiting the opportunities for its employment.
The Restatement Second also covers negotiable instruments,2 con-
tracts of fire, surety or casualty insurance,2 8 and commercial arbitra-
only be done in an unusual situation, such as when the state with the rule of
incapacity has an equally great, or greater, interest in the person involved. This
might be so, for example, when the person involved is a resident of the state with
the rule of incapacity and when his relationship to the state of his domicile is
relatively slight.
Id.
25. See id. When the parties fail to chose the law to govern the contract, it ap-
pears that, in addition to the assumption that they understand the capacity rules of the
forum with the most significant contacts, various state interests in protecting those with
a particular incapacity take preeminence over the expectations of the parties. Accord-
ing to the RESTATEMENT SECOND:
Usually, at least, rules of incapacity are designed for the protection of the persons
to whom capacity to contract is denied. Such rules frequently embody a suffi-
ciently strong policy to warrant their application under the circumstances stated in
section 188 to the sacrifice of that choice-of-law principle which favors application
of a law that would uphold the contract in order to protect the justified expecta-
tions of the parties.
Id.
26. EEC Convention, supra note 5, Article 1I.
27. RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 13, §§ 214-217. The restatement provides
as follows:
This Topic is directed to choice-of-law questions relating to negotiable drafts (bills
of exchange), including checks, and notes and certificates of deposit.
Id. at Topic 4, introductory note ("Negotiable Instruments").
28. RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 13, § 193. The section provides as follows:
The validity of a contract of fire, surety or casualty insurance and the rights cre-
1989] THE EEC CONVENTION
tion.2 9 Inclusion of commercial arbitration may be the most significant
difference in scope between the Restatement Second and the EEC
Convention.
The Advisory Report on the EEC Convention explains the ration-
ale for excluding arbitration from the treaty.3" Arbitration is consid-
ered part of the law of procedure, and it would be difficult to separate
the procedural and substantive aspects of an arbitration agreement.31
The Restatement Second follows U.S. case law that has allowed
the parties to choose the law that governed their arbitration agree-
ment. 32 The Reporter's note gives one example of this case law.33
The ability to avoid the application of the EEC Convention by in-
cluding an arbitration provision in a contract is particularly trouble-
some. The use of arbitration has been increasing as a means of resolv-
ing international contract disputes.34 Therefore, the exclusion of
ated thereby are determined by the local law of the state which the parties under-
stood was to be the principal location of the insured risk during the term of the
policy, unless with respect to the particular issue, some other state has a more
significant relationship under the principles stated in section 6 to the transaction
and the parties, in which the local law of the other state will be applied.
Id.
29. RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 13, §§ 218-220. The restatement provides
as follows:
This Topic deals with the law governing the validity and effect of an arbitration
agreement between private persons (§ 218) and the methods of enforcing it (§
219). This Topic is also concerned with the effect which will be given a foreign
arbitration award (§ 220).
Id. at Topic 5, introductory note, ("Commercial Arbitration").
30. Convention Report at 20 (1980).
31. Id.
32. The RESTATEMENT SECOND provides as follows:
i. Choice of two laws. The extent to which the parties may choose to have the local
law of two or more states govern matters that do not lie within their contractual
capacity is uncertain. For example, it is uncertain whether the parties may effec-
tively provide that their capacity to make the contract shall be governed by the
local law of another. When the parties are domiciled in different states and each
has capacity to enter into the contract under the local law of his domicil, they
should, subject to the conditions stated in the rule of this Section, be able effec-
tively to provide in the contract that the capacity of each shall be determined by
the local law of his domicile.
Id. at § 187, Comment (i).
33. Id. reporter's note. ("For a case suggesting that the parties may choose a spe-
cial law to govern the validity of an arbitration clause contained in an agreement, see
Matter of Electronic & Missile Facilities, Inc., N.Y.L.J. Dec. 26, 1962, at 10, col. 5").
34. G. DELAUME, TRANSNATIONAL CONTRACTS, APPLICABLE LAW AND SETTLE-
MENT OF DISPUTES: LAW AND PRACTICE, section 9.01, at 281 (1988) ("Rather than
submitting to the jurisdiction of domestic courts, the parties to transnational contracts
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arbitration undermines the unification of choice of law rules for con-
tracts in the EEC.
III. THE RULES WHEN PARTIES HAVE MADE A CHOICE OF LAW
The general rule for choice of law with contracts under the EEC
Convention is contained in Article 3(1), which states that the contract
shall be governed by the law chosen by the parties."' The choice under
3(1) must be express or demonstrated with reasonable certainty by the
terms of the contract or the circumstances of the case. 36 Article 3(2)
expands the freedom of parties to choose the law governing the con-
tract by allowing the choice of law to be made at any time. 7
The ability of the parties to choose the law governing their con-
tract under the EEC Convention, however, is not unlimited. Article
3(2) of the EEC Convention also states that the parties' choice of law
cannot prejudice mandatory rights38 where all other elements relevant
to the situation are connected to one country. 9
The general rule under the Restatement Second for allowing the
contracting parties to choose the law governing their contract is very
often prefer to have recourse to arbitration for the settlement of contract disputes.");
Note, General Principles of Law in International Commercial Arbitration, 101 HARV.
L. REV. 1816, 1817 (1988) ("the rise in international commerce and investment in
recent years has brought an increased use of arbitration to resolve disputes").
35. EEC Convention, supra note 5, at Article 3(1). The EEC Convention provides
as follows:
(1) A contract shall be governed by the law chosen by the parties. The choice
must be express or demonstrated with reasonable certainty by the terms of the
contract or the circumstances of the case. By their choice the parties can select the
law applicable to the whole or a part only of the contract.
Id.
36. Id.
37. EEC Convention, supra note 5, at Article 3(2). The EEC
Convention provides as follows:
(2) The parties may at any time agree to subject the contract to a law other than
that which previously governed it, whether as a result of an earlier choice under
this Article or of other provisions of this Convention. Any variation by the parties
of the law to be applied made after the conclusion of the contract shall not
prejudice its formal validity under Article 9 or adversely affect the rights of third
parties.
Id.
38. The definition of what is a mandatory right under Article 3(2), or what con-
tacts to a country are necessary, will be explained in conjunction with an explanation of
the limits of choice of contract law under the Restatement Second. See infra notes 46-
55 and accompanying text.
39. Id.
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similar. In Section 187(1) of the Restatement Second, the parties may
choose the law governing their contract if it could have been found by
explicit provision in the agreement.40 This requirement appears, at first
glance, to be more restrictive than the express or implied choice al-
lowed by the EEC Convention. The language of the Restatement Sec-
ond, however, does not require the parties to actually embody their
choice of law explicitly in their agreement.4 Instead, the Restatement
Second only requires that the choice of law be one that the parties
could have resolved by explicit provision in their agreement.42 The im-
plied choice of law situations covered by the EEC Convention would
appear to be examples of when the parties could have explicitly embod-
ied their choice of law decision in their agreement. The Restatement
Second commentary supports this view by suggesting that the parties
could evidence their choice of law in the contract by employing certain
legal expressions, or by making references to legal doctrines that are
peculiar to the local law of a particular state.43
The parties, however, do not have an unlimited ability to choose
what law will govern their contract. Restatement Second Section
187(2) places two restrictions on the ability of contracting parties to
choose the law governing their contract. First, a choice of law will be
rejected if the chosen state law has no substantial relation to the parties
or the transaction and there is no other reasonable basis for the
40. RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 13, § 187(1). The section provides as
follows:
(1) The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their contractual rights
and duties will be applied if the particular issue is one which the parties could




43. RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 13, § 187 comment a. The comment pro-
vides as follows:
a. Scope of section. The rule of this Section is applicable only in situations where
it is established to the satisfaction of the forum that the parties have chosen the
state of the applicable law. When the parties have made such a choice, they will
usually refer expressly to the state of the chosen law in their contract, and this is
the best way of insuring that their desires will be given effect. But even when the
contract does not refer to any state, the forum may nevertheless be able to con-
clude from its provisions that the parties did wish to have the law of a particular
state applied. So the fact that the contract contains legal expressions, or makes
reference to legal doctrines, that are peculiar to the local law of a particular state
may provide persuasive evidence that the parties wished to have this law applied.
19891
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choice.4" The second circumstance that will result in the rejection of a
choice of law is if the chosen law is contrary to the fundamental policy
of the state that has a materially greater interest than the chosen state
in determination of the particular issue and which would have been the
law under Restatement Section 188 if no choice had been made."
While both the EEC Convention and the Restatement Second al-
low the contracting parties to choose the law governing their contract, a
comparison of the exceptions where parties' choices of law will not be
honored in both systems show differences between the systems in the
amount of discretion given to parties in their choice. The broad, general
directive of the EEC Convention allowing the parties to choose their
law is circumscribed by only very narrow limitations. Parties' choices
will only be rejected when they conflict with a mandatory rule of a
state." A mandatory rule is defined by Article 3(3) of the EEC Con-
vention as a rule of law that cannot be derogated from by contract.
4 7
The circular nature of this definition will be explained further in con-
junction with Article 7 of the EEC Convention."'
Under the EEC Convention, the limitation on party choice by
mandatory rules only becomes effective in certain situations. Under Ar-
ticle 3(3), mandatory rules supersede the parties' choice of law when
44. RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 13, § 187(2). The section provides as
follows:
(2) The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their contractual rights
and duties will be applied, even if the particular issue is one which the parties
could not have resolved by an explicit provision in their agreement directed to that
issue, unless either
(a) the chosen state has no substantial relationship to the parties or the transaction
and there is no other reasonable basis for the parties' choice; or
(b) application of the law of the chosen state would be contrary to a fundamental
policy of a state which has a materially greater interest than the chosen state in
the determination of the particular issue and which, under the rule of section 188,
would be the state of the applicable law in the absence of an effective choice of
law by the parties.
Id.
45. Id.
46. EEC Convention, supra note 5, at Article 3(3). The EEC Convention provides
as follows:
(3) The fact that the parties have chosen a foreign law, whether or not accompa-
nied by the choice of a foreign tribunal, shall not, where all of the other elements
relevant to the situation at the time of the choice are connected with one country
only, prejudice the application of rules of the law of that country which cannot be
derogated from by contract, hereinafter called "mandatory rules."
Id.
47. Id.
48. See infra 51-55 and accompanying text.
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all other relevant elements of the contract connect to one country."9
The forum court, however, has the discretion to decide what elements
of the contract are relevant and thereby can control the application of
mandatory rules.50
The application of mandatory rules is further controlled by Article
7 of the EEC Convention, which provides that a court may, in its dis-
cretion, give effect to mandatory rules of another country to which the
situation has a close connection." The effect of Article 7(1) is to allow
courts to use mandatory rules to police agreements where less than all
relevant elements of the contract connect to one country.
Article 7 also helps to define what are mandatory rules. It first
requires that the parties' contract be analyzed to determine if the situa-
tion has a close contact to another country or even if all relevant ele-
ments of the contract connect to one country.52 After using the parties'
contacts to identify other sources of foreign law, Article 7 would then
consider the nature, purpose, and the consequences of applying or not
applying the mandatory rule. One commentator on the EEC Conven-
tion described the process of defining mandatory rules as a form of
interest analysis. 3
Some state interests in contracts are so strong that the forum may
apply forum law to the contract irrespective of the law otherwise appli-
cable to the contract." Article 7(2) recognizes the primacy of, and ref-
uses to restrict the application of forum law in areas such as rules of
49. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
50. Id.
51. EEC Convention, supra note 5, at Article 7(1). The EEC Convention provides
as follows:
(1) When applying under this Convention the law of a country, effect may be
given to the mandatory rules of the law of another country with which the situa-
tion has a close connection, and insofar as, under the law of the latter country,
those rules must be applied whatever the law applicable to the contract. In consid-
ering whether to give effect to these mandatory rules, regard shall be had to their
nature and purpose and to the consequences of their application or non-
application.
Id.
52. EEC Convention, supra note 5, at Article 7.
53. P. Williams, The EEC Convention of the Law Applicable to Contractual Ob-
ligations, 35 INT'L AND COmP. L.Q. 22-23 (1986).
54. EEC Convention, supra note 5, at Article 7(2). The EEC Convention provides
as follows:
(2) Nothing in this Convention shall restrict the application of the rules of the law
of the forum in a situation where they are mandatory irrespective of the law other-
wise applicable to the contract.
Id. See also Convention Report at 70.
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cartels, competition and restrictive practices, consumer protection and
certain rules concerning carriage. 5
There may be more limitations on parties' choice of law in the
Restatement Second. The Restatement Second requires that the inter-
ests of competing states concerning the contract be isolated.56 After
comparing these state interests, the state whose law was chosen to gov-
ern the contract must have a substantial relationship to the parties or
the transaction.5 7
The substantial relationship requirement of the Restatement Sec-
ond, however, will not invalidate a choice of law if some other reasona-
ble basis for the choice exists.5 8 For example, where a contract is made
or performed in the third world, or any place where commercial law is
comparatively undeveloped, the parties may chose New York or Eng-
lish law instead for convenience and certainty.59
The Restatement Second requires greater contacts between the
country whose law was chosen to govern the contract than does the
EEC Convention. The Restatement Second requires a substantial rela-
tionship between the jurisdiction and the subject matter of the con-
tract.6" The EEC Convention, in contrast, will only reject the parties'
choice of law if all relevant elements of the contract favor a country
whose law was not chosen to govern the contract.61
55. Id.
56. RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 13, § 187(2)(b).
57. Id.
58. RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 13, § 187(2)(a).
59. See RESTATEMENT SECOND, note 13, § 187 comment f. The comment provides
as follows:
The parties to a multistate contract may have a reasonable basis for choosing a
state with which the contract has no substantial relationship. For example, when
contracting in countries whose legal systems are strange to them as well relatively
immature, the parties should be able to choose a law on the ground that they know
it well and that it is sufficiently developed. For only in this way can they be sure of
knowing accurately the extent of their rights and duties under the contract. So
parties to a contract for the transportation of goods by sea between two countries
with relatively undeveloped legal systems should be permitted to submit their con-
tract to some well-known and highly elaborated commercial law.
Id. See generally H. SMIT, N. GULSTON AND S. LEVITSKY, INTERNATIONAL CON-
TRACTS Section 3.02 [4], at 279 (Matthew Bender 1981) ("The alternate view [to se-
lecting the place of arbitration by its law] is to select cities and countries merely from
the angle of their geographical or other attractiveness, and no doubt many businessmen
approach the choice of a forum in such a frivolous vein. Paris is a nice city. Bermuda
has an amenable climate, Switzerland is located at the center of Europe, etc. ").
60. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
61. EEC Convention, supra note 5, at Article 3(3).
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The difference in requirements between the two systems is mini-
mized by the Restatement Second's escape clause which allows a
choice of law supported only by a reasonable basis."2 Once a reasonable
basis exists for the choice, the Restatement Second would appear to
completely ignore the substantial relationship between the contract, the
parties, and the country whose law was chosen.6 3 Of course, this may
overstate the importance of this escape clause because the situations
where a choice of law will be reasonable and yet not be substantially
related to the contract or transaction will be few.
The Restatement Second also considers the fundamental nature of
state policies. After the competing interests of the concerned states are
identified, the policies must be balanced. By insuring that the other
states whose laws were not chosen to govern the contract do not have
interests that are substantially greater than the chosen state's, the Re-
statement Second puts an outer boundary on the quality of local poli-
cies that can supersede the parties' choice of law. 64 An additional bal-
ancing of state policies is also included in the Restatement's
requirement that the parties' choice must be the same as the result of a
Section 188 analysis as if the parties had made no choice of law. 5 Sec-
tion 188 requires a threshold analysis that the issue in question relate
significantly to a state.66The EEC Convention may also evaluate the quality of forum poli-
cies. If the measure of a mandatory rule is determined by some form of
interest analysis, then conflicting policies of the interested states might
be balanced. There is no guarantee, however, that interest analysis re-
quires a balancing of conflicting forum policies. For example, one defi-
nition of interest analysis would resort to the conflict rule of the forum,
and not balance, when a true conflict exists between the policies of two
different states.67
62. See RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 13, § 187(2)(a).
63. See supra notes 44 and 58.
64. See supra note 44.
65. See supra notes 44-57 and accompanying text.
66. See infra notes 88-90.
67. B. Currie, Married Women's Contracts: A Study in Conflict-of-Law Method,
25 U. CHI. L. REV. 227 (1958), reprinted in B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS, 77, 117-21 (Duke Univ. Press 1963). Professor Currie would de-
fine a "true conflict" of law as the case "in which the advancement of the interest of
one state results in subordination or impairment of the interest of the other." Id. at
107. "Each state has a policy, expressed in its law, and each state has a legitimate
interest, because of its relationship to one of the parties, in applying its law and policy
to the determination of the case." Id. at 107-108.
Where a true conflict exists, Professor Currie believes that "no satisfactory solu-
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The EEC Convention does contain a provision that will reject
choices of law by the parties for reasons of public policy. Article 16
disallows the application of foreign law if it is manifestly incompatible
with relevant policies of the adjudicating forum. 68 While there is no
definition of "manifestly incompatible" in the EEC Convention, many
courts in both the EEC and the U.S. have applied the public policy
exception in a variety of settings. 9
It is difficult to decide whether the EEC Convention or the Re-
statement Second is more restrictive when evaluating the importance of
forum policies. While there are semantical differences between the two
rules, both appear to restrict the superseding of parties' choice of law to
instances when the chosen foreign law conflicts with important state
policies of the adjudicating jurisdiction. 0 Whether or not the public
policy exception speaks to manifest incompatibility, as with the EEC
Convention, or to important policy conflicts, as with the Restatement
Second, would seem to make little difference in application.
The Restatement Second, however, adds an extra requirement that
controls the parties' choice of law. While both the Restatement Second
and the EEC Convention balance the importance of the policies of the
chosen forum against the policies of the adjudicating forum when they
conflict, the Restatement Second adds a requirement in Section 187
that the parties' chosen law must be compatible with the policies of the
forum which would have been the default forum had no choice of law
been made.7 1
tion can possibly be evolved by means of the resources of conflict-of-laws law." Id. at
117. As a result, Professor Currie recommends as follows:
The sensible and clearly constitutional thing for any court to do, confronted with a
true conflict of interests, is to apply its own law. In this way it can be sure at least
that it is consistently advancing the policy of its own state. It should apply its own
law, not because of any notion or pretense that the problem is one relating to
procedure, but simply because a court should never apply any other law except
when there is a good reason for doing so.
Id. at 119.
68. EEC Convention, supra note 5, at Article 16 ("Order public"). The EEC
Convention provides as follows:
The application of a rule of the law of any country specified by this Convention
may be refused only if such application is manifestly incompatible with the public
policy ("order public") of the forum.
Id.
69. E. SCOLES, P. HAY, supra note 1, at 637-643 ("validity and public policy"); E.
RABEL, THE CONFLICT OF LAws: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 104 (2d ed. 1964) (describ-
ing the operation of the Hague Convention 1955).
70. Compare supra notes 37 and 43.
71. RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 13, § 187(2)(b).
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Another difference between the EEC Convention and the Restate-
ment Second is the former's restriction of the parties' choice of law
according to the subject matter of the contract; specifically, Article 5
limits the parties' ability to choose the law governing consumer con-
tracts .7 Article 5(1) defines a consumer contract as one whose object is
the supply of goods or services to a person for a purpose which can be
regarded as outside his trade or profession.7 3 The EEC Convention
Committee Report also suggests that other areas of law can be used to
define consumer contracts by analogy.
74
Article 5(2) specifies three types of consumer contracts where the
parties' choice of law will be ineffective: invitations to contract by for-
eign companies, the use of foreign agents, and trips arranged by foreign
sellers. 5 In these three instances Article 5(3) of the EEC Convention
replaces the parties' choice of law with that of the consumer's habitual
residence.76 The Restatement Second has no protection for consumer
72. EEC Convention, supra note 5, at Article 5 ("Certain Consumer Contracts").
73. EEC Convention, supra note 5, at Article 5(1). The EEC
Convention provides as follows:
(1) This Article applies to a contract the object of which is the supply of goods or
services to a person ("the consumer") for a purpose which can be regarded as
being outside his trade or profession, or a contract for the provision of credit for
that object.
Id.
74. EEC Convention, Article 5(1). See generally, Convention Report at 55-56
(1980).
75. EEC Convention, supra note 5, at Article 5(2). The EEC Convention provides
as follows:
(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 3, a choice of law made by the par-
ties shall not have the result of depriving the consumer of the protection afforded
to him by the mandatory rules of the law of the country in which he has his
habitual residence:
-if in that country the conclusion of the contract was preceded by a specific invita-
tion addressed to him or by advertising, and he had taken in that country all the
steps necessary on his part for the conclusion of the contract, or
-if the other party or his agent received the consumer's order in that country, or
-if the contract is for the sale of goods and the consumer travelled from that coun-
try to another country and there gave his order, provided that the consumer's jour-
ney was arranged by the seller for the purpose of inducing the consumer to buy.
Id.
76. EEC Convention, supra note 5, at Article 5(3). The EEC Convention provides
as follows:
(3) Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 4, a contract to which this Article
applies shall, in the absence of choice in accordance with Article 3, be governed by
the law of the country in which the consumer has his habitual residence if it is
entered into in the circumstances described in paragraph (2) of this Article.
238 MD. JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & TRADE [Vol. 13
contracts similar to that of the EEC Convention. Other areas of U.S.
law, however, such as the doctrine of unconscionability of the Uniform
Commercial Code might be used to void a choice of law clause in a
consumer's contract. 7
IV. THE RULES WHEN THE PARTIES MAKE No CHOICE OF LAW
When the parties neglect to choose the law that will govern their
contract, both the EEC Convention and the Restatement Second con-
tain rules to determine what law will apply to the contract. Under the
EEC Convention, there are four different choice of law rules when the
parties fail to choose. Article 4(2) regulates contract performance by
corporations.78 Performance in consumer contracts, as is discussed
supra, is governed by Article 5(3) which pre-selects the law of the con-
sumer's domicile. Corporations, in like fashion, are governed by the
place of the corporation's central administration.7 9 Finally, immovables
are governed by the law of the situs, 80 and employment contracts are
77. 1 Unif. Laws Ann. § 2-302(1), p. 252 (1976) (Uniform Commercial Code).
U.C.C. § 2-302 provides as follows:
(1) If the court as a matter of law find the contract or any clause of the contract
to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to
enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the
unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable
clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
id.
78. See infra note 79.
79. EEC Convention, supra note 5, at Article 4(2). The EEC
Convention provides as follows:
(2) Subject to the provisions of paragraph (5) of this Article, it shall be presumed
that the contract is most closely connected with the country where the party who
is to effect the performance which is characteristic of the contract has, at the time
of conclusion of the contract, his habitual residence, or, in the case of a body
corporate or unincorporated, its central administration. However, if the contract is
entered into in the course of that party's trade or profession, that country shall be
the country in which the principal place of business is situated or, where under the
terms of the contract the performance is to be effected through a place of business
other than the principal place of business, the country in which that other place of
business is situated.
Id.
80. EEC Convention, supra note 5, at Article 4(3). The EEC Convention provides
as follows:
(3) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (2) of this Article, to the extent
that the subject matter of the contract is a right in immovable property or a right
to use immovable property it shall be presumed that the contract is most closely
connected with the country where the immovable property is situated.
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governed by the place where the work is performed."
The concept of characteristic performance in Article 4(2) of the
EEC Convention deserves special discussion.8 2 Characteristic perform-
ance is a civil law concept that has no analog in either English or U.S.
law. It focuses on the functioning of the contract and not on elements
unrelated to the essence of the contractual obligation, such as the na-
tionality of the contracting parties or the place where the contract was
concluded. 3
Some commentators have criticized the ambiguity in determining
the true nature, the reality, or the essence of the contract in character-
istic performance analysis. 4 The reporters of the EEC Convention,
however, disagree and find the characteristic performance concept nec-
essary when no choice of law has been made in order to determine
what law is most closely connected to the contract.8 5 Needless to say,
use of this concept will create difficulties for English and U.S. legal
practitioners who are unfamiliar with it. Consequently, lawyers in civil
law jurisdictions will, at least initially, have a certain advantage under
Article 4(2) in its current form.
The Restatement Second has fewer articulated choice of law rules
where the parties fail to make a choice of law. In Section 188(3) the
Restatement Second provides that if the place of performance is the
place the contract was negotiated, that state's law is usually applied.8
Beyond this provision, both the EEC Convention and the Restatement
Second retain substantial judicial flexibility. Article 4(5) of the EEC
Convention provides that if the circumstances as a whole suggest the
contract is more closely connected to another country, a court can dis-
81. EEC Convention, supra note 5, at Article 6(1) ("Individual employment con-
tracts"). The EEC Convention provides as follows:
(1) Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 3, in a contract of employment a
choice of law made by the parties shall not have the result of depriving the em-
ployee of the protection afforded to him by the mandatory rules of the law which
would be applicable under paragraph (2) in the absence of choice.
Id.
82. EEC Convention, supra note 5, at Article 4(2).
83. Convention Report at 46.
84. See e.g., H. D'Oliveira, "Characteristic Obligation" In The Draft EEC Obli-
gation Convention, 25 AM. J. COMP. L. 303, 326 (1977).
85. Convention Report at 47.
86. RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 13, § 188(3). The section provides as
follows:
(3) If the place of negotiating the contract and the place of performance are in the
same state, the local law of this state will usually be applied, except as otherwise
provided in sections 189-199 and 203.
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regard the rule for choice of law where no choice of law was made by
the parties.8 7
The Restatement Second uses a more complicated system of fac-
tors for determining choice of law for contracts where the parties fail to
choose. Section 188 will apply the law that has the most significant
relation to the transaction and parties.8 8 Section 6 specifies seven fac-
tors for consideration in determining significant relations:
1. The need of the interstate and international systems,
2. The relevant policies of the forum,
3. Relevant policies/interests of interested states,
4. Protect justified expectations,
5. Basic policies underlying fields of law,
6. Certainty, predictability, and uniformity of results,
7. Ease in determination and application of the law to be applied. 9
Section 188 lists the following five factors to be considered in ap-
plying the section 6 factors:
1. Place of contracting,
2. Place of contract negotiation,
3. Place of performance,
4. Location of the subject matter of the contract,
5. Domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation, and
place of business of the parties."
87. EEC Convention, supra note 5, at Article 4(5) at 7. The EEC Convention
provides as follows:
(5) Paragraph (2) shall not apply if the characteristic performance cannot be de-
termined, and the presumptions in paragraphs (2), (3) and (4) shall be disre-
garded if it appears from the circumstances as a whole that the contract is more
closely connected with another country.
Id.
88. RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 13, § 188(1). The section provides as
follows:
(1) The rights and duties of the parties with respect to an issue in contract are
determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has the
most significant relationship to the transaction and the parties under the principle
stated in section 6.
Id.
89. RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 13, § 6.
90. RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 13, § 188(2). The section provides as
follows:
(2) In the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties (see § 187), the
contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of section 6 to deter-
mine the law applicable to an issue include:
(a)the place of contracting,
(b)the place of negotiations of the contract,
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In spite of the detailed factors provided, both systems yield wide,
almost unlimited discretion. The two lists of multiple factors are so en-
compassing as to be meaningless, and are so nebulous as to justify
nearly any decision.9"
Article 10 of the EEC Convention emphasizes that choice of law
rules will in particular be applied to questions of contract interpreta-
tion, performance, consequences of breach as limited by procedural
law, and consequences of contract nullity. 92 Article 10(2) further em-
phasizes that "in relation to the manner of performance and the steps
to be taken in the event of defective performance regard shall be had to
the law of the country in which performance takes place."" Article 10
is applied to all instances, whether or not a choice of law has been
made, and specifically it applies to consumer and employment
contracts. 4
(c)the place of performance,
(d)the location of the subject matter of the contract, and
(e)the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business
of the parties.
These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with
respect to the particular issue.
Id.
91. E. SCOLES AND P. HAY, supra note 1, at § 18.13, p. 652 ("The 'approach' of
section 188 has its own problems because it also claims wide applicability and provides
little guidance as to the relative weight of the criteria suggested which would aid in the
development of concrete rules which, in turn are necessary in order to achieve the goal
of predictability").
92. EEC Convention, supra note 5, at Article 10(l)(a-e). The EEC Convention
provides as follows:
(1) The law applicable to a contract by virtue of Article 3 to 6 and 12 of this
Convention shall govern in particular:
(a) interpretation;
(b) performance;
(c) within the limits of the powers conferred on the court by its procedural law,
the consequences of breach, including the assessment of damages insofar as it is
governed by rules of law;
(d)the various ways of extinguishing obligations, and prescription and limitation of
actions;
(e) the consequences of nullity of the contract.
Id.
93. EEC Convention, supra note 5, at Article 10(2). The EEC Convention pro-
vides as follows:
(2) In relation to the manner of performance and the steps to be taken in the event
of defective performance regard shall be had to the law of the country in which
performance takes place.
Id.
94. EEC Convention, supra note 5, at Article 10(l).
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The Restatement Second fails to expressly specify its choice of law
rules for every aspect of contract performance. The apparently in-
tended comprehensive coverage is exemplified in comment (a) to sec-
tion 186. Comment (a) states clearly that the Restatement Second ap-
plies to all contracts and to all issues in contract.95 In addition, Article
10 of the EEC Convention specifies that "in relation to the manner of
performance and the steps to be taken in the event of the defective
performance regard shall be had to the law of the country in which
performance takes place. '"96
Comment (e) to Section 188 of the Restatement Second also rec-
ognizes that the state where the contract is to be performed has an
obvious interest in the nature of the performance and in the party who
is to perform." Place of performance, therefore, will be weighed very
heavily when deciding what state has the most significant contacts to
the contract. Section 188(3) suggests that the law of the place of per-
formance would usually be applied when that place is the same as the
place of negotiating the contract. 8
The drafters of the Restatement Second, however, were concerned
that a blanket rule applying the law of the place of performance would
not cover instances where the place of performance is not known at the
time of contracting and where the contract performance occurs over
more than one state. 9 In either of these circumstances, other contacts
95. RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 13, at § 186, comment a
("Scope of section"). The Restatement Second provides as follows:
a. Scope of section. The rule of this Section states a principle applicable to all
contracts and to all issues in contract.
id.
96. EEC Convention, supra note 5, at Article 10(2).
97. RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 13, at § 188, comment e ("The place of
performance"). The Restatement Second provides as follows:
The place of performance, The state where performance is to occur under a con-
tract has an obvious interest in the nature of the performance and in the party who
is to perform. So the state where performance is to occur has an obvious interest in
the question whether this performance will be illegal (see § 202). When both par-
ties are to perform in the state, this state will have so close a relationship to the
transaction and the parties that it will often be the state of the applicable law even
with respect to issues that do not relate strictly to performance. And this is even
more likely to be so if, in addition, both parties are domiciled in the state.
Id.
98. RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 13, at § 188(3).
99. RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 13, at § 188 comment e. The Restatement
provides as follows:
the place of performance can bear little weight in the choice of applicable law
when (1) at the time of contracting it is either uncertain or unknown, or when (2)
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must be used instead of place of performance.
Section 206 of the Restatement Second also provides a specific
rule for mode and manner of contract performance. In matters involv-
ing the details of performance, the law of the place where performance
occurs governs performance under the contract. 100 The difficulty with
the place of performance rule is determining what is a detail of per-
formance. Since by definition breach of contract litigation concerns
performance or failure to perform after the time of initial agreement,101
the place of performance rule may be the exception that swallows the
remainder of the choice of law rules. At the very least, the place of
performance rule can be criticized as offering one more opportunity for
the parties and the courts to manipulate the law of the contract by
characterization.
V. RENVOI UNDER THE EEC CONVENTION AND THE RESTATEMENT
SECOND
The EEC Convention and the Restatement Second differ in their
approaches to the doctrine of renvoi. Both choice of law systems recog-
nize the uncertainty that occurs when a court applies the total law in-
cluding the conflict of law rules of a forum, instead of the forum's local
law. 0 2 The uncertainty that renvoi creates undermines the predictabil-
ity of result necessary for stability of contract.103 The EEC Convention
prohibits the use of renvoi in all situations, regardless if the parties
performance by a party is to be divided more or less equally among two or more
states with different local law rules on the particular issue.
Id.
100. RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 13, at § 206. The Restatement Second
provides as follows:
Issues relating to details of performance of a contract are determined by the local
law of the place of performance.
Id.
101. See W. JAEGER, 11 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 1290, at 2 (3d ed. 1968)
("As a contract consists of a binding promise or set of promises, a breach of contract is
a failure, without legal excuse, to perform any promise which forms the whole or part
of a contract."); A. CORBIN, 4 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 987, at 956-57 (1951) ("In
most cases dealing with repudiation and discussing the law of anticipatory breach, the
repudiation was only in part anticipatory. There was a breach, either great or small, by
actual non-performance at a time when performance was required by the terms of the
contract, accompanied by a repudiation of the duty to render any further performance
under the contract".)
102. See M. GIULIANO AND P. LAGARDE, supra note 6, at 101 ("Exclusion of
Renvoi").
103. E. SCOLES AND P. HAY, supra note 1, at 67-72.
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chose or did not choose the law governing their contract. Article 15
provides that "the application of the law of any country specified by
this Convention means the application of the rules of law in force in
that country other than its rules of private international law."104
The Restatement Second treats the issue of renvoi differently de-
pending on whether or not the parties chose or did not choose the law
governing their contract. Section 187 would allow the parties to specify
the application of renvoi to their contract."0 5 Should the parties fail to
indicate their intention regarding renvoi, Section 187 carries a pre-
sumption that renvoi not operate.10 6
Where the parties fail to specify the law governing their contract,
the Restatement Second would not apply the renvoi doctrine.1 07 Com-
ment (g) to Section 188 explains that where there is an absence of
effective choice of law by the parties, the choice of law rules refer to
the local law for determining the law that governs the contract.0 8
The reporter's notes to Section 186(b) of the Restatement Second
justify the limitation of renvoi because of the uncertainty created by
the doctrine's application and the infrequent occasions where renvoi has
been applied in the contracts area. 0 9 The parties, however, are still
allowed to specifically elect to apply the renvoi doctrine.110
104. EEC Convention, supra note 5, at Article 15 ("Exclusion of Renvoi"). The
EEC Convention provides as follows:
The application of the law of any country specified by this Convention means the
application of the rules of law in force in that country other than its rules of private
international law.
Id.
105. See infra note 106.
106. RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 13, at § 187(3). The Restatement pro-
vides as follows:
(3) In the absence of a contrary indication of intention, the reference is to the
local law of the state of the chosen law.
Id.
107. See infra note 108.
108. RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 13, at § 188, comment g. The Restate-
ment Second provides as follows:
g. For reasons stated in § 186, Comment b, the reference is to the "local law" of
the state of the applicable law and not to the state's "law" which means the total-
ity of its law including its choice-of-law rules.
Id.
109. See Id.
110. RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 13, at § 186 comment b ("Reference is to
'local law' of selected state"). The Restatement Second provides as follows:
b. Reference is to "local law" of selected state. The reference, in the absence of a
contrary indication of intention (see § 187, Comment b), is the "local law" of the
state of the applicable law and not to that state's "law" which means the totality
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The EEC Convention finds renvoi to contradict the Convention's
purpose of providing certainty for choice of law in contracts."' The
complete elimination of the renvoi doctrine, however, may be unneces-
sary. In the rare instances where the parties specifically agree to choose
the law that governs their contract and also specifically agree to the
selection of the forum, the parties' intent to apply renvoi should be ef-
fectuated. The application of renvoi in this instance appears to be justi-
fied by one of the primary goals of contract interpretation, to give ef-
fect to the parties' intent if at all possible. In other words, no risks of
uncertainty can be claimed where renvoi was applied voluntarily and
presumably with forethought.
VI. CONCLUSION
The EEC Convention and the Restatement Second are for the
most part similar in their approaches to choice of law for contracts.
When parties attempt to designate the law that governs their contract,
however, the Restatement Second imposes greater restrictions. While
the EEC Convention generally allows greater freedom to choose con-
tract law, in the area of consumer contracts no such freedom of choice
is permitted. Where the parties fail to designate the law that governs
their contract, both the EEC Convention and the Restatement Second
provide substantial judicial discretion in deciding what law shall apply.
of its law including its choice-of-law rules (see § 4).
Id.
11. See supra notes 102-104 and accompanying text.
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